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The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal here in R. v. Chehifl overturns the trial judge's
conclusion that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information the police obtained from the computer manifest. With respect, their application of the totality of the circumstances test is subject to question at several
important points.
For example, in assessing the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, the Court of Appeal relies on the fact that the Westjet website informs
customers that "information will be disclosed to the authorities without your
knowledge and consent as required by law." The court then observes of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) that "s.
7(3)(c.l)(ii) authorizes disclosure of information for law enforcement purposes."2 They conclude from these facts that it would not be reasonable to expect privacy in information supplied to the airline.
However, this reasoning seems inverted. Section 7(3)(c.l)(ii) actually only authorizes disclosure for law enforcement purposes to a government institution
that has "identified its lawful authority to obtain the information." That is also
the essential message of the Westjet website — that the rule is non-disclosure
and the exception is when disclosure is "required by law." To say that information will be disclosed when there is, for example, a warrant requiring its disclosure, is not to diminish the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. Quite the contrary, the recognition that something like a warrant will be
required before the information is released stresses precisely that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.
In fact, this consideration seems relevant as well to the question of whether the
evidence-gathering technique was reasonable. The Court of Appeal relies on the
fact that the RCMP could only obtain the information "with the permission of
Westjet" to help find there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Surely it is
relevant to note in this context, then, that proper permission was not obtained:
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the employees who allowed the RCMP to see the computer screen acted in violation of Westjet's policy and possibly in violation of PIPED A.
Further, in concluding that no intimate details of the accused's lifestyle were
exposed, the Court of Appeal rejects the approach to this issue taken by the trial
judge. The trial judge had noted the kinds of information that might have been in
the manifest: "physical disabilities of a passenger, possible mental disabilities,
allergies, religious affiliation and a passengers' attitude toward other religious
affiliations."3 The trial judge had found on the evidence that the information
which might be in the manifest about a passenger was "unlimited" and went to a
biographical core of personal information. The Court of Appeal rejected an approach based on what might be in the manifest, stating instead that 'The totality
of the circumstances assessment is not a theoretical inquiry. It must focus on the
information actually targeted and accessed.. ."4
With respect, the trial judge's approach to this issue is far more consistent with
the basic approach to section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal case of Canada
(Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v.
Southam Inc. (1984), (sub nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.) 41 C.R. (3d) 97, [1984]
2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). From the start, the Court has made clear that the fundamental purpose of section 8 is
to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy.
That purpose requires a means of preventing unjustified searches before they
happen, not simply of determining, after the fact, whether they ought to have
occurred in the first place.5

If this is the goal, it does not make sense to wait and see what actually turns up
in the passenger manifest and then decide whether there had been a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it. Rather, it makes more sense to reason as the trial
judge did and to consider what might be there in deciding whether it can be
examined by the police at will.
Finally, it is worth noting an additional point, though it is not crucial to the
Court of Appeal's conclusion. The Crown in this case had argued that the absence of a subjective expectation of privacy was automatically fatal to the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy claim. The Court of Appeal seems
sympathetic to this argument, but decides to consider other factors because of
"the ambiguity in the case law." There is some justification for identifying ambiguity but not so much that the Crown's argument should be persuasive.
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At one point it would have been perfectly clear that the Crown's argument was
wrong. In R. v. Tessling (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 207, 2004 SCC 67 (S.C.C.), Justice Binnie stated quite straightforwardly for the Court that
The subjective expectation of privacy is important but its absence should not
be used too quickly to undermine the protection afforded by s. 8 to the values
of a free and democratic society . . . Suggestions that a diminished subjective
expectation of privacy should automatically result in a lowering of constitutional protection should therefore be opposed, [emphasis in original]6

This is an unambiguous rejection of exactly the argument the Crown made in
this case.7
To the extent any ambiguity has arisen since Tessling, it is in the way in which
the test for reasonable expectation of privacy in the case of informational privacy was phrased in R. v. Patrick (2009), 64 C.R. (6th) 1, 2009 SCC 17
(S.C.C.). There, the Court posed two successive steps in the test:
3. Did the appellant have a subjective expectation of privacy in the information content of the garbage?
4. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable? [emphasis in original]**

One could read the connector "if so" at the start of the fourth question as implying that an affirmative answer to the third question was an absolute prerequisite.
However, there is nothing in the discussion of subjective expectation of privacy
in Patrick suggesting that this factor has somehow become a sine qua non. This
would be an extraordinarily oblique way of overturning the very clear statement
of policy made in Tessling.
In addition, there is no reason to think that the connector is meant to be read that
way. The Court — speaking in Patrick through Justice Binnie once again — had
introduced these questions as being "adapted to the circumstances" of the particular case. In Patrick, the Court presumed that there was a subjective expectation
of privacy — presumed in the face of the trial judge's contrary conclusion and
the absence of testimony on the point from the accused. In this context, it is
much more reasonable to assume that the Court merely stated "if so" because it
knew perfectly well it would be moving to the fourth question, rather than as a
surreptitious way of changing an unambiguous position in law about a point
which was not in issue in the case.
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breach" (Chehil, supra, at para. 39).
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Finally, it is worth noting that, on a policy level, no single factor should be able
to settle the analysis either for or against a finding of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. That is, of course, exactly what it means to say that one must consider
"the totality of the circumstances."

